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STANLEY FISH**
We must begin with a sense of what theory is, and I shall derive mine
from a question Herbert Wechsler often put to his students. "Ask
yourself," he would say, "'Would I reach the same result if the
substantive interests were otherwise?"" The challenge of the question is
to the student who has determined where the right lies in a disputed
matter, and who now must demonstrate that, even if every circumstantial
particular of the case were varied-if the plaintiff were a woman instead
of a man, if the object of hate speech was a descendant of someone who
came over on the Mayflower rather than the descendant of a slave, if the
publication subject to regulation were The New York Times rather than
Hustler, if the organization requesting a permit were the Salvation Army
rather than the Aryan Nation-both the result and the reasoning leading
to it would be the same. This requirement, in all its severity and
stringency, is the theory requirement, the requirement that cases be
decided from a perspective-sometimes called the forum of principle,
the realm of neutral principles, or the view from nowhere-unattached
to any local point of view, comprehensive doctrine, partisan agenda,
ideological vision, or preferred state of political arrangements. For some
years now, I have argued that there is no such perspective, and that the
abstractions usually thought to be its habitation are empty of content. Of
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course, that is in fact another way of formulating the theory
requirement-that it be empty of content. The theory of the kind I am
interested in-grand theory, overarching theory, general theory,
independent theory-claims to abstract away from the thick texture of
particular situations with their built-in investments, sedimented histories,
contemporary urgencies, and so on, and move toward a conceptual place
purified of such particulars and inhabited by large abstractions-
fairness, equality, neutrality, equal opportunity, autonomy, tolerance,
diversity, efficiency-hostage to the presuppositions of no point of view
or agenda but capable of pronouncing judgment on any point of view or
agenda. When faced with opposing courses of action or conflicting
accounts of what the law demands, one can ask of the contenders,
"Which is most responsive to the imperative of fairness?" or "which
most conduces to the achievement of equality?" or which will promote
the greatest diversity?"
The trouble with such questions (or so my argument goes) is that you
will not be able to answer them without fleshing out your favorite
abstraction with some set of the particulars it supposedly transcends. If
you are determined to go with the alternative that is fairest, you will first
have to decide whether by "fairness" you mean fairness to everyone
independently of his or her achievements, failures, crimes, citizenship,
gender, sexual orientation, or fairness inflected by at least some of the
considerations in my non-exhaustive list. If "equality" is your loadstar,
then you will have to decide whether you mean equality of access (a
strongly procedural notion) or equality of opportunity (which will take
into substantive account the current situation and past history of those on
whom equality is to be conferred). And, if "diversity" is your
watchword, you will have to decide whether under its umbrella you wish
to include pedophiles and Neo-Nazis; if you do not, you will have to
think of reasons-and those reasons will inevitably be particular and
historical-for excluding them. And if you refuse this task and, when
asked "What do you mean by fairness or equality or diversity?" merely
repeat the words as if they were a mantra, your interlocutor will rightly
complain that you have given him no direction, that if the abstraction is
not thickened and provided with content, there is no way to get from it to
the real-world dilemma he faces, or-it is the same thing-there are so
many ways that the choosing of any one them will be arbitrary.2
2. This does not mean that invoking an abstraction like fairness or inequality will
not make a difference in your argument, or that there will be no difference in the
difference made if you invoke one rather than the other. It is just that the difference will
have been made not by an abstraction purged of substance, but by a substantively
changed word or phrase, the meaning of which has been conferred by the disciplinary
context into which it is now reinserted. Someone who invokes fairness at the point
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I sometimes make this point in a melodramatic way by declaring that
neutral principles and the realm of general theory do not exist.3
However, the formulation is too sweeping and should be qualified.
Neutral principles obviously exist in the sense that people continually
invoke them in support of arguments and agendas, and declare that they
are following them, and accuse their opponents of falling away from
them. They even exist in the pure form often claimed for them on the
level of philosophical analysis. It is an intelligible and even pleasant
activity to sit around and debate the virtues of strict constructionism
versus judicial activism, originalism versus present-oriented
interpretation, interpretivism versus non-interpretivism, deontology
versus consequentialism, individual rights versus utilitarianism,
indeterminacy versus plain meaning, or pragmatism versus almost
anything. It is the next step-the step of deriving from theses debates
some methodological aid that will be of help when you descend to a
particular problem-that cannot be taken, or can only be taken by
providing your theory or principle with a substance (and therefore with a
direction) borrowed from one of the very contexts from which it
supposedly enjoys a magisterial independence. And once you have done
that, it is true to say that your theory or neutral principle does not exist,
for in its degraded-that is, contextual-form it has lost the
distinctiveness that would make the designation "theory" or "principle"
meaningful, make it something more (or less) than just another
substantive argument.
The point is, finally, a simple one: there is no relationship between
the level on which high-theory debates usually occur and the level on
which you are asked to sort through the complexities of a real life
situation and determine a course of action. This is pretty much what
Professor Allen says in a slightly different vocabulary: "[S]o far as I can
tell not a single thing relevant to the legal system or the governance of
the nation turns on who is right and who is wrong about the ontology of
morality or ethics. Literally nothing."4 And it has also been said by
several others, including Richard Posner in his recent book The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory: "there doesn't appear to be a
where someone else would invoke diversity will be taking the discussion in a different
direction; but there will always be a third person arguing that, properly construed,
diversity and fairness are one and the same.
3. I do this in my "there's no such as" moods.
4. Ronald J. Allen, Two Aspects of Law and Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 743,
744 (2000).
universal moral law that is neither a tautology (such as "don't murder")
nor an abstraction (such as "don't lie all the time") too lofty ever to
touch ground and resolve a moral issue, that is, a moral question on
which there is disagreement."5 Legal sociologist Brian Tamanaha, Dean
of St. John's University School of Law, says it this way: the
"overarching end" of judges may be "to do the right thing," but "[i]n
itself this overarching end is empty of content;"6 "[legal theory
generated legitimation-'law provides one right answer'--or
delegitimation-'law is politics'-alike seem largely beside the point to
the massive intertial presence of law in the United States."7 My personal
favorite, Matthew Kramer, Director of Studies in Law at Churchill
College, Cambridge, declares roundly: "Fish quite rightly contends that
a proposition at the level of jurisprudence cannot entail a particular
proposition at the level of judicial practice."8 He gives his reason for
this pleasing judgment as thus: "Precisely because a metaphysical
doctrine must abstract itself from specifics ... in an effort to probe what
undergirds all specifics of any sort, it retains its lesser or greater cogency
regardless of the ways any specific facts.., have turned out.".. "Strictly
spealdng, then, a proposition of the former [jurisprudential] type cannot
serve as an argumentative justification for a proposition of the latter
[judicially practical] type."'  That is, you may be correct in your
jurisprudence (whatever it is) or incorrect, but your correctness will not
enable you, nor your incorrectness impair you, when you come to
consider a specific set of facts and embark on the effort to make sense of
them. The theory game is fun to play and can even yield winners and
losers, but its relevance to the world of practice is nil unless it is so
highly mediated that it is no longer theory at all.
Of course, my ability to adduce four legal worthies for my side of
things does not mean that the argument we severally make holds the day
or is acceptable to everyone. There are still normative theorists aplenty.
So Ronald Dworkin, a die-hard if there ever was one, ends a recent
essay, entitled "In Praise of Theory," this way: "We must strive, so far as
we can, not to apply one theory of liability to pharmaceutical companies
and a different one to motorists, not to embrace one theory of free
speech when we are worried about pornography and another when we
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 19
(1999).
6. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 240 (1997).
7. Id. at251.
8. MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN THE REALM OF LEGAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 83
(1999).
9. Matthew H. Kramer, God, Greed, and Flesh: Saint Paul, Thomas Hobbes, and
the Nature/Nurture Debate, 30 S.J. PHIL. 51, 52 (1992).
10. KRAMER, supra note 8, at 84.
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are worried about flag burning."" We can move in that desirable
direction, he says, only if we "raise our eyes a bit from the particular
cases... and look at neighboring areas of the law, or maybe even raise
our eyes quite a bit and look in general, say, to accident law more
generally, or to constitutional law more generall,, or to our assumptions
about judicial competence or responsibility more generally,"'2 spiraling
ever upward in a "justificatory ascent' 3 toward the forum of principle.
Dworkin's presentation of his jurisprudence is dramaturgical; he
portrays himself as the common sense moral realist beset on all sides by
various sects of pragmatist and postmodemist absurdists, and he
succeeds, rhetorically at least, by tilting against views none of his targets
actually holds. Here, for example, is his report of what Richard Rorty
supposedly says: although Rorty will acknowledge that mountains exist,
"if you ask him.., whether mountains exist as part of Reality As It
Really Is, with very big capital letters on these phrases-he would reply
no, that is ridiculous."'4 No, Rorty would reply that (a) although I do not
doubt that Reality As It Is exists, we can assert nothing about it except in
the vocabularies of description and predication available to us as finite
creatures, vocabularies generated by the structures and sedimented
histories of our cultures, educational traditions, disciplinary matrices,
and so on, and (b) that, while in any one of those human vocabularies, to
say that mountains exist-and are bigger than hills and more enduring
than skyscrapers-is to speak an obvious truth, to say that Reality As It
Is would also confirm the truth that mountains exists is to say something
that is not so much wrong but unintelligible; for no sense can be given to
the notion that Reality As It Is makes propositions about itself. Human
beings make propositions, and it is only in relation to those language-
limited propositions that issues of truth and falsehood about the world
arise and can be resolved by contingent and revisable historical methods
of verification, disconfirmation, and so on. Or, in Rorty's own words,
"The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only
descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own-
unaided by the describing activities of human beings-cannot."'" That
is, "the world on its own" is surely a category of existence, but not one
11. Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 AIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 376 (1997).
12. Id. at 356-57.
13. Id. at 356.
14. Id. at 363.
15. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOIDARITY 5 (1989).
about which humans can know or say or pronounce anything; what
humans can know and say and pronounce about are the objects, events,
and states available to them within the systems of knowledge and
predication in which they live and move and have their being, systems of
knowledge and predication that at once both enable and limit what can
be seen, asserted, and declared to be true or false: "where there are no
sentences there is no truth" and "sentences are elements of human
languages, and.., human languages are human creations."'6 Any of the
questions Dworkin might put to Rorty-Is genocide wrong? Do
mountains exist? Does water boil at a certain temperature?-can be
answered frmnly and without metaphysical reservation (even by persons
aware that the answers could change if the systems of knowledge and
predications within which we "naturally" move change). The question
that cannot be answered about any of these matters is: is this so in
Reality As It Is?-is this really so, where by "really" is meant
"independently of any of the ways of knowing and predicating and
verifying available to us as human beings." Rorty's answer to that
question, and it is also mine, is not "no," but, rather, the question doesn't
make any sense because no sense can be given to the category
"independently of the ways of knowing, predicating, and verifying
available to us as human beings."
So what? What does it mean? It means what Dworkin fears it means:
the law, and any other structure of organized human knowledge, is
rhetorical, that is, ungrounded in Reality As It Really Is, and therefore
contingently formed and, at least potentially, available to revision and
capable of disappearing from the Earth. This is not as big a deal as it
sounds. It would be a big deal if the unavailability of confirmation by an
unmediated Reality, the unavailability of foundations, the unavailability
of independent grounds, were disabling. Those who think it is disabling
typically conflate two propositions, one of which is true, the other false.
The first and true proposition is that our convictions and practices cannot
be grounded in some reality or authority or principle wholly independent
of them; the second and false proposition is that therefore our
convictions and practices are ungrounded. The second proposition will
seem necessarily to follow from the first only if you assume that without
independent grounds and convictions, our assertions and actions rest on
quicksand. But, in fact, convictions and practices come equipped with
their own grounds in the form of assumptions concerning what the task
to be performed is, and a material history of the task's performance,
complete with authoritative pronouncements; revered, even sacred, texts;
canonical authorities; exemplary achievements; known patterns of
16. Id.
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reward, punishment, advancement, success failure, and so on. The
richness and density of this material structure is such that those who
move within it are quite secure in their knowledge of what they are
doing and the location and value of the resources available to them for
the doing of it; this remains so even when disciplinary actors become
aware of the contingent and potentially revisable status of the tools at
their disposal. It may seem counterintuitive, but your awareness, even
knowledge, that the routines you are running and the evidentiary
procedures you rely on and believe in are features of a contingent and
revisable practice, of a practice that is, as they say, "socially
constructed," will in no way erode the confidence with which you run
those routines or generate that evidence.
The reason is one I have already given. The assertion that
independent grounds are unavailable or that everything is socially
constructed is made at so general or lofty a level that it does not touch
down on particulars and does not in and of itself provide either
justification for or an argument against any action taken within a real
world context. That is to say, the argument that so-called neutral
principles are unhelpful to embedded actors because they only have
traction when fleshed out by the substantive concerns they supposedly
transcend is itself unhelpful, does not tell you what to do, does not tel
you what not to do, does not tell you that there is nothing to do. All it
tells you is that guidance will not come from neutral principles, and that
if you want to do something you will have to look to other resources,
and it will not tell you what those resources are. Those resources, if
there are any-not all challenges can be successfully met-will be
discovered to be internal to the practices that rest on no other foundation
than themselves-in the practice of law, on statutes, rules, norms,
standards, precedents, leading cases, categories of causes of action,
three-, five-, and ten-part tests, general doctrines like stare decisis, more
local doctrines like consideration, proximate cause and felony murder;
and even if, as is the case today, these resources have been the object of
skeptical rhetorical and postmodern analysis, they will still be the ones
you turn to when you are confronted by, and accept the assignment of
dealing with, an actual, everyday, garden variety, legal problem. And
you will do this precisely because your skeptical, postmodern analysis
does not tell you what to do. It is not that kind of thing; it is a
metacritical account of the practice, not a recipe for performing it, or a
knock-down reason for abandoning it. You may know that the key
terms in contract law have been "deconstructed" by scholars as different
as Stanley Henderson, Grant Gilmore, and Claire Dalton; and you may
know that the vocabulary at the heart of First Amendment doctrine has
been exploded by scholars as different as Steve Schiffren, Richard Abel,
Richard Delgado, and Fred Schauer. But if you commit yourself to
participate in a dispute framed in contract or First Amendment terms,
those are the terms you will go with, even if in the course of going with
them you labor to stretch, bend, enlarge, or restrict them in ways also
licensed by the practice you are engaging in. Nor will you be acting in
bad faith. Remember, the conviction that your practice is not
underwritten by independent grounds and is revisable says nothing about
the worthiness of that practice or about the stability-in the short run-
of its machinery, unless of course you believe that without independent
grounds, there is no worth and no stability. But that's just a mistake.
The mistake, as I have already said, is to think that any of this matters,
to declare as Dworkin does that if we wish to pursue the "indispensable
ambition"' to fashion a just society in which we can live together as
equals, we must turn our backs on postmodernists, radical feminists,
strong neo-pragmatists, and social constructionists, and commit
ourselves to the theoretical project of integrity and to the hope that
through the process of justificatory ascent we might someday live with
Hercules (his superman judge) in the forum of principle. But it is
equally a mistake-it is the same mistake-to think that the
counterargument, the argument that no forum of principle exists and
limited, local, revisable contexts are all we have, matters either. If
Dworkin attributes too much negative power to the
rhetorical/deconstructive account, his opponents accord it too much
positive power by endowing it with the capacity to generate practices
always alert to the provisional status of their own pronouncements.
Both sides take the rhetorical, deconstructive, or postmodern lesson too
much to heart, one by worrying that it will leave nothing standing, the
other by hoping that it will leave nothing standing.
Consider, for example, the case of Pierre Schlag. In a recent essay,
Schlag says many of the things I have been saying here: the "normative
life of the law has no readily apparent relation to the actual structure or
content of legal practice."'8 He continues:
[P]racticing lawyers experience law as a complex network of bureaucratic
power arrangements that they have learned to manipulate. That is what legal
practice is about. Words get used, arguments get made, institutional pressure
builds, situations become increasingly intolerable, somebody gives, and a
17. See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 376.
18. Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801,
803 (1991).
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settlement is reached, or a contract is signed, or a jury comes back with a
verdict. It's law. 9
-And Schlag sees, too, that while normative legal thought cannot make
good on its promise to deliver the one right answer or an answer
generated by universal principles, it does nevertheless do real (and in his
mind regrettable) work by establishing the authority of a "style of
argument... that reinforces a certain... representation of social life-
of who the key actors are, of how they are related, of the status of
discourse, communication, and reason, of the relations of theory and
practice, form and substance, outcome and process." 0 Here one might
expect a rehearsal of the sins this style of argument enables, preliminary
to the recommendation of the style of argument Schiag favors; but
instead we find normative thought charged with what he regards as the
most grievous sin of all: "[N]ormative legal thought has not paid much
attention to its own rhetorical situation;" 21 that is, it "is not terribly self-
conscious or self-critical." Well, of course it is not. Normative legal
thought does not include in itself any recognition of its rhetoricity. If it
did, it would no longer be normative legal thought; rather it would be
some form of thought-sociological or anthropological in nature-that
took normative legal thought as its object, and the activity it would be
engaged in would not be the activity of doing law but the activity of
reflecting on, analyzing, or dramatizing doing law. Schlag precisely, but
helpfully, misses the point when he compares the actual practice of law
unfavorably to the presentation of the practice of law on the TV program
L.A. Law:
On L.A. Law... it is often a real-that is to say, a dramatic-question whether
acts of conscience are acts of morality or acts of rationalization, whether acts of
persuasion are acts of rationality or acts of power, and whether the relations
among the various actors are overdetermined, undetermined, or determined at
all. By contrast to LA. Law, normative legal thought seems thin and two-
dimensional....P
But it is the business of a theatrical presentation to provide its audience
with a perspective or frame from the vantage point of which what the
characters say and do can be assessed in terms of which they are
19. Id. at 804 (internal citation omitted).
20. Id. at 834.
21. Id. at 852.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 876 (internal citation omitted).
themselves unaware; and their lack of awareness is not a fault, but a
condition of their performance and of the parsing out of tasks between
them and the audience.' The audience of L.A. Law does not applaud a
lawyer on the screen because he has picked the right precedent (unlike a
judge or the opposing attorney, most in the audience will know only the
precedent written into the script), or found the right rubric within which
the facts can be construed in favor of his client; the audience of L.A. Law
applauds or hisses (metaphorically, of course) because the lawyer's
action is a sign in the larger drama (most of which concerns matters
outside the courtroom) of some advance or relapse in the narrative of his
moral life (he does or does not betray a client for some "larger purpose";
he does or does not ask a question designed to provoke from a witness a
small lie that can then be turned against her in very large ways). In the
TV program, the theater of the courtroom is a theater within a theater,
and the vocabulary of the law acquires value and meaning in the context
of concerns that are extralegal. In the actual practice of law-theatrical
to be sure, but nonetheless a different theater-the vocabulary of law
refers directly to the issues at stake and names the categories within
which everyone's performance will be assessed. Nor should this
difference be moralized as Schlag moralizes it when he speaks of
comparative thinness and dimensionality. Neither theater is thinner than
the other; one may lack the level of distanced, staged reflection that
defines the other, but the other in turn lacks the level of consequences in
the world-fines levied, verdicts given, sentences served, lives lost-
that makes the first so gripping in its own terms.
Schlag believes that anything that operates on its own terms is suspect
and must be deconstructed until it acquires the requisite critical self-
consciousness; he does not exempt deconstruction itself from this
requirement: "it would seem particularly appropriate for
deconsruction ... to examine the scene in which it is operating-or
rather, to displace and overturn the conceptual and nonconceptual
matrices and forces within which it is received";' and, similarly, "it
would seem appropriate for legal neo-pragmatists to examine their own
context: the social, cognitive, and rhetorical scene of their own thought,
the scholarly situation within which their talks and articles and classes
are being produced." 6 It would be appropriate because, after all, if the
24. I know, of course, that in certain avant-garde productions the characters turn
away from the enclosure of the state set and speak directly to the audience, thus breaking
the theatrical illusion; but it is really not broken, merely extended in the form of a new
convention that will succeed, if it succeeds, by aesthetic criteria, not the criteria of "real
life."
25. Schlag, supra note 18, at 890.
26. Id. at 888.
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anti-normative lesson (the lesson of rhetoricity) is that everything and
everyone is situated, contextual and provisional, should not those who
preach that lesson apply it to themselves? Should not one difference
between normative and anti-normative theorists be that the latter are
more ready to question their own assumptions than the former? The
answer is "no" because, like normative thought, anti-normative thought
is a place one has reached in a philosophical conversation; it is not a
mode of being, but an answer to some questions posed in an academic
discipline. While it is certainly possible to step back from anti-
normative thought and scrutinize the "matrices and forces" that make it
intelligible and forceful (then you could mount a TV show called L.A.
Philosophy Department), that stepping back would mark the moment
when you stopped doing anti-normative thought and began doing the
cultural study of anti-normative thought. Self-consciousness about its
own assumptions is no more an integral part of anti-normative thought
than it is of normative thought. Indeed, anti-normative or rhetorical
thought, taken seriously, precludes awareness of its own assumptions,
for what is required for it to have such awareness is a place to the side of
its own presuppositions, and it is anti-normative/rhetorical thought itself
that tells us that there is not and could not be any such place. Ironically,
the demand Schlag makes of rhetorical/deconstructive legal thought-
that it critically "challenge the very discursive scene that enables"21 it-
is an essentialist demand; it is the demand that anti-normative thought be
normative, and produce, from the vantage point of its generality,
changes in the behavior of those who have been persuaded of it.
Rhetorical/deconstructive legal thought produces nothing, for, like
normative legal thought, it is not a practice, but an account of a practice.
Just as normative legal thought cannot confer on the practices of which it
is an account, the qualities it prizes (stability, neutrality, and so on),
neither can rhetorical/deconstructive legal thought confer on the practice
of which it is an account the qualities it prizes (indeterminacy, dispersal,
de-centeredness, and so on). Theorists like Schlag may be right when
they describe the law and everything in it as "socially constructed," but
the rightness of the description does no work. It does not lead to an
alteration in practice. There is no practice of social constructedness,
rhetoricity, or deconstruction, and it is hard to imagine what one would
be like. What would be its imperatives? Make everything up? Be
27. Id. at 892.
rhetorical? Question the ground you walk on, or rather the ground you
do not walk on? The insight of social constructedness, or rhetoricity,
goes nowhere, issues in nothing, is of no consequence whatsoever.
Schlag knows this, but he knows it as a complaint. The complaint is
that because the stage on which our rhetorically constructed selves play
their part is so completely furnished, "the critical reflexive turns become
(virtually) unthinkable" and "for the most part, we are simply not
capable of even entertaining the requisite doubts to investigate how we
are socially and rhetorically constructed." ' I would delete "virtually"
and "for the most part," which suggest that there are some strong
souls-Schlag perhaps-who are able to catch a glimpse of their
groundless, rhetorically constructed selves, while the rest of us continue
to languish in various states of complacency and false consciousness.
But the inability to look sideways at oneself is not a failure or defect of
thought; it is thought. Thought-the complex of assumptions,
demarcations, hierarchies, desiderata--covers the field, occupies the
whole of consciousness, and there is no space left over in which the
especially alert and responsible intelligence can spy and monitor its own
limitations. That again is the essentialist or foundationalist dream-the
dream of entering a space purged of the inclinations our lived histories
have given us-and it is not a dream someone of Schlag's views should
be flirting with. Schlag's mistake can be seen by considering the nature
of the "doubts" he considers "requisite," the doubts he thinks too few of
us ever entertain. They are cosmic doubts, not doubts about this or that,
but doubts about the entire cognitive structure within which "this" or
"that" emerge as objects of inquiry. That form of doubt is not available
to situated beings, and therefore it cannot be a criticism of anyone, or of
the forms thought habitually his, that such wholesale doubt is absent.
This does not mean that doubts of all kind do not arise, only that they
arise in ordinary contexts-when some expectation has been
disappointed, some person has performed badly, or some experiment has
not turned out well. Doubts can be provoked by almost anything, but
they cannot be provoked by some theory or anti-theory, even if you find
it persuasive. This is because, to make my original point once again, the
persuasiveness of a theory exists on so general a level that the only
doubt it provokes is doubt about the soundness of some rival theory
pitched at a similarly general level. The rest of the world, the world we
live in when we are not being theoreticians or anti-theoreticians, will not
be touched by that kind of general, all-encompassing doubt, although it
can certainly be touched by the doubts we experience in a thousand
everyday moments.
28. Id. at 893.
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Now that I have exploded the claims of normativists and anti-
normativists alike, where does that leave me? I guess I am a pragmatist,
although by that I mean something very limited. I am a pragmatist in the
sense that if you were to ask me a series of questions (Could we find
independent grounds for our practices and convictions? Are we
progressing toward a clearer sight of something called Reality? Could
we identify moral imperatives that would be appropriate to any and all
situations? Do texts have plain and perspicuous meanings?), I would
give answers (no, no, no, and no) that place me in the pragmatist camp,
rather than in the realist camp, or the proceduralist camp, or the strict-
constructionist camp. But that would be it; nothing else would follow,
no method or style of lawyering or judging. In short, my pragmatism is
a badge of identification in the philosophy game, not a recipe for action
or a way of deciding between alternative paths in particular situations.
In the taxonomy provided by Matthew Kramer, mine is a philosophical
pragmatism-a "position which denies that knowledge can be grounded
on absolute foundations"-rather than a methodological pragmatism-a
"position that attaches great importance to lively debate and open-
mindedness and flexibility." 29 Kramer goes on to say, and I agree with
him, that the fact of having been persuaded to the one does not commit
you to the other: philosophical "pragmatism cannot necessarily point us
toward methodological pragmatism or any other specific methodological
stance."30 The reason, of course, is that no position on the level of
philosophical generality can point us toward any methodological stance
because that level of generality is by definition at a huge distance from
the world of lived particulars and provides no bridge to it. Once you
have determined your philosophical position-if you are the kind of
person who likes to do that sort of thing-all the work of making
decisions, assessing evidence, and reaching conclusions remains, and
you will not be helped one whit by remembering that you are,
philosophically, a pragmatist, a postmodemist, or anything else. Brian
Tamanaha makes the point concisely: "Pragmatism has nothing
affirmative to offer precisely at the point at which the hard questions
begin, when we are called upon to make and justify judgements about
good and bad, right and wrong."' And Posner says pretty much the
same thing when he remarks that a pragmatist account of judging does
29. KRAMER, supra note 8, at 94.
30. Id. at 97.
31. TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 246.
not direct judges to be pragmatists or tell them "what is best."3
Unfortunately, however, both Tamanaha and Posner deviate from their
common insight and move in the direction of claiming more for
pragmatism than the parsimony of their argument properly allows.
Immediately after having declared that pragmatism has nothing
affirmative to offer, Tamanaha has it offering something negative.
First, it insists that any normative arguments based upon an alleged special
insight into the Absolute are based upon a false claim; secondly, it suggests that
what counts when determining which normative assertions we should accept is
whether... the assertions result in consequences we find desirable; thirdly, it
reminds us that the best way to determine whether the consequences are
desirable is to [pay] close attention to the facts of the matter.33
But these little lessons are either practically unhelpful, or not exclusively
pragmatist, or so general as to be truisms. The assertion that there is no
Absolute to invoke is made at the level of philosophical argument and
does not preclude declaring the absolute truth about a matter as you now
see it. And everyone, even a determined anti-consequentialist, is
concerned to bring about a desirable outcome (hewing to the law, no
matter what, is, after all, an outcome, if it could be achieved); the real
question is what is the desirable outcome, and pragmatism cannot
answer it or even identify outcomes that are undesirable. And, of
course, everyone pays close attention to the facts; it's just that everyone
has a different idea of what the facts are and where they are to be found,
and again pragmatism will not direct you toward the right ones or warn
you away from the wrong ones. Exactly the same analysis applies to
Posner's characterization of pragmatism as "a disposition to ground
policy judgments on facts and consequences rather than on
conceptualisms and generalities."' But again, fact and consequences are
taken into account by everyone-could one disdain them and still
proceed in any intelligible sense?-and one's skepticism about
conceptualisms and generalities in their pure form does not deprive you
of generalizations that derive their meaning from the historical contexts
of practice to which they are now applied. And while Posner is surely
right to say that "[p]ragmatism in its role as skeptical challenger of
orthodox philosophy encourages a skeptical view of the foundations of
orthodox law,"35 the rightness is philosophical and has no implications
for what one does or does not do in practice. Skepticism about law's
foundations does not generate a skeptical legal practice-what would
32. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM
248 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).
33. TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 246.
34. POSNER, supra note 5, at 227.
35. POSNER, supra note 5, at 228.
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such an animal be like?-although it could generate a determination to
leave the law and take up something else.
In the end, Tamanaha and Posner yield to the temptation of wishing to
say something, of wishing to claim for their arguments on the level of
theory some practical payoff, however modest and qualified. That is the
temptation I always try to avoid by resolutely refusing to draw any
conclusions from the assertions I characteristically make, chief of which
is the assertion that there is no such thing as anything. It is a frequent
complaint of those who read my work or hear me speak that they know
nothing of my position on the issues glanced at in my discussions,
whether those issues are moral, political, methodological, or procedural.
This is often regarded as a defect in my position-that it yields nothing
in the way of recommendations or policies-but it is my position and
my argument. What that argument aspires to is a severe minimalism, a
refusal to be positive so pure that it provides those who hear it and
understand it with no handle to grasp or lever to operate. It is this
parsimony of ambition that distinguishes it from almost any other
argument in theory, and distinguishes it too from Cass Sunstein's recent
book, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court.36
Whereas my minimalism is a function of my unwillingness to turn my
argument into a project (lest it become a version of what it inveighs
against), Sunstein's minimalism is a project, the project of "saying no
more than necessary to justify... and leaving as much as possible
undecided." 37 He calls this project "decisional minimalism"38 and hopes
that if he presents it attractively enough, it will lead to a minimalist court
whose characteristics would be as follows:
A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves many things
undecided. It is alert to the existence of reasonable disagreement in a
heterogeneous society. It knows that there is much that it does not know; it is
intensely aware of its own limitations. It seeks to decide cases on narrow
grounds. It avoids clear rules and final resolutions.... [Ilt attempts to promote
the democratic ideals of participation, deliberation, and responsiveness. 9
I am not in the business of promoting anything. I merely want to
explain to you that whatever you might want to promote, no general




39. Id. at ix-x.
theory is going to help you; and, for that matter, no argument that theory
is not going to help you will help you either. If it has been my argument
that theses on the level of general philosophy do not dictate answers or
strategies on the level of practical behavior, it must be the case that no
form of behavior follows from that argument, which is itself general.
Indeed, if there is anything I have said here that moves you in some
direction, if after hearing me you go away in possession of something
useful, I will have failed.
